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Owning Up: Determining the Proper Test for 
Ownership Liability Under CERCLA 
James Morrow  
INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, residents of Niagara Falls received an unwelcome 
surprise when they discovered hazardous chemical and industrial 
wastes oozing up from the ground into their homes.
1
 Between 1942 
and 1953, the Hooker Chemical and Plastics Company had buried 
approximately 21,800 tons of chemical waste in a sixteen-acre ditch 
at a site affectionately called the ―Love Canal.‖2 After capping the 
Love Canal with clay, Hooker Chemical sold the land to the Niagara 
Falls Board of Education.
3
 Homes and schools were constructed in 
the area, and a vibrant community was born. Only years later, when 
neighborhood residents began to develop a range of illnesses, did the 
extent of the chemical danger become clear.
4
  
The Love Canal garnered national attention when, in 1978, the 
New York Commissioner of Health declared an emergency and 
ordered the area evacuated.
5
 The United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) attempted to intervene, but found it lacked 
authority to remediate the site under existing statutes.
6
 In reaction to 
 
 
  J.D. (2013), Washington University School of Law; B.A., Psychology (2009), 
Sonoma State University. 
 1. JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES, HAZARDOUS WASTE 179–80 (2d ed. 
1993). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. at 180. The site was sold for the nominal price of one dollar. Id. 
 4. Such illnesses included cancer, mental retardation, rashes, and migraine headaches. 
David R. Rich, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of CERCLA 
Section 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 643, 650 n.60 (1986). 
 5. BATTLE & LIPELES, supra note 1, at 180. The New York Commissioner for Public 
Health declared a health emergency in 1978. Id. In 1979, the Commissioner ordered the 
evacuation of all families with pregnant women and children under two years of age. Id. 
 6. Id. Specifically, the EPA attempted to remediate pursuant to its authority under the 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1977), and the Resource Conservation and 
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the Love Canal emergency, Congress took measures to vest the EPA 
with the authority necessary to adequately respond to incidents of 
hazardous contamination and the release of pollutants that might 
harm public health.
7
 In doing so, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)
8
 was 
born, fundamentally altering the federal approach to environmental 
protection and enforcement.
9
 
The most comprehensive environmental statute since the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
10
 Congress enacted CERCLA to 
―provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency 
response for hazardous substances released into the environment and 
the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.‖11 The statute 
 
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–7000 (1976). However, while the Clean Water Act 
authorized Coast Guard response to oil spills and hazardous pollution in navigable waters, it 
was inapplicable to inland soil and groundwater contamination. Moreover, the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act permitted EPA response only to present environmental 
emergencies, and its applicability to parties whose contribution to contamination occurred 
wholly in the past was uncertain. BATTLE & LIPELES, supra note 1, at 180. 
 7. Specifically, the EPA was authorized to take removal or remedial action: 
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of 
such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial release into 
the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and 
substantial danger to the public health or welfare. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012). 
 8. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2012)). 
 9. The Love Canal emergency ranks as one of the most highly publicized episodes of 
hazardous contamination in contemporary United States history. CAROLE STERN SWITZER & 
PETER L. GRAY, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION & 
LIABILITY ACT (SUPERFUND) 3 (2d ed. 2002). Although Congress was already considering 
expanding the scope of federal environmental statutes, it is undeniable this incident was a 
driving force behind the legislative activity that eventually became CERCLA. A. Theodore 
Steegmann Jr., History of Love Canal and SUNY at Buffalo’s Response: History, the University 
Role, and Health Research, 8 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 174–76 (2002). For additional 
information on the history of the Love Canal emergency, see Sheldon Hurwitz & Dan D. 
Kohane, The Love Canal—Insurance Coverage for Environmental Accidents, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 
378, 380 (1983). On a more positive note, in March of 2004, the Love Canal was declared safe, 
and its name was removed from the National Priorities List of contaminated sites—over two 
decades after EPA remediation began. Linda Roeder, EPA Final Rule Removes Love Canal  
Site From National List, Announces Area Cleanup, 35 ENV‘T REP. (BNA) NO. 190, at 2057 
(Oct. 1, 2004). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331–4347 (2012). 
 11. 94 Stat. at 2767. 
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authorized the EPA to expend agency resources in the cleanup of 
contaminated sites, and vested the agency with the authority to 
compel those responsible for contaminations to take remedial 
action.
12
 In either circumstance, the EPA could sue potentially 
responsible parties (PRPs) to recover the agency‘s financial 
expenditures.
13
 The statute also created the Hazardous Substance 
Superfund as a repository for PRP contributions and for the monies 
expended in site remediation.
14
 
Under CERCLA, a prima facie case for liability requires a moving 
party to demonstrate, inter alia, that the defendant falls within one of 
 
 12. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, 33 (1980). When discussing the purposes of the then-pending 
bill H.R. 7020 (a precursor to CERCLA), the House Committee on Foreign and Interstate 
Commerce—upon recommending passage of the bill—noted that:  
[The Act] would establish a federal cause of action for liability for the costs of 
emergency assistance, removal, and containment action . . . to provide a mechanism 
for prompt recovery of monies expended for the costs of such action from the 
Hazardous Waste Response Fund . . . from persons responsible therefor and to induce 
such potentially liable persons to pursue appropriate environmental response actions 
voluntarily. 
Id. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). Subsection (a)(4) provides in pertinent part that 
responsible persons shall be liable for—  
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government 
or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with 
the national contingency plan; 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the 
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a 
release; and 
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under [§ 
9604(i)]. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (2012). CERCLA authorized apportionment of funds from the 
Hazardous Substance Superfund of no more than $8.5 billion for five years from October 17, 
1986, and no more than $5.1 billion between October 1, 1991, and September 30, 1994. Id. In 
addition to reimbursement from responsible parties, the Superfund is replenished by 
appropriations from the federal government‘s general fund, and recently received a special 
infusion of approximately $600 million as part of the American Reinvestment and Recovery 
Act of 2009 (Stimulus Bill), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 15 (2009) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 6 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.). U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, OSWER DIRECTIVE NO. 
9360.0-46, INITIAL GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SUPERFUND REMEDIAL PROGRAM 
PROVISIONS OF THE AM. REINVESTMENT & RECOVERY ACT OF 2009 (2009). 
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four classes of PRPs listed in § 107(a) of the statute.
15
 These PRPs 
broadly include: (1) the owners and operators of a vessel or facility; 
(2) the previous owners or operators of a facility at the time of 
contamination; (3) persons who arranged for the disposal or transport 
of a hazardous substance; and (4) those who transported a hazardous 
substance.
16
 Defendants who fall into any of these categories are 
subject to strict liability
17
 and will be held jointly and severally 
liability for the costs of cleanup.
18
 While a defendant might escape 
liability in limited circumstances,
19
 courts generally construe the 
 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). There are four elements to a prima facie showing of 
CERCLA liability. Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1999). In 
addition to demonstrating the defendant is a PRP, the moving party must show that ―(1) the site 
is a ‗facility‘ as defined in CERCLA, (2) a release or threatened release of a hazardous 
substance has occurred, [and] (3) the release or threatened release has caused the plaintiff to 
incur response costs that were necessary and consistent with the National Contingency Plan set 
up by CERCLA.‖ Id. (citing 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 
1358 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917, 111 S. Ct. 2014, 114 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1991)). 
These other three elements are expansively defined and deserving of their own scholarly work, 
however this Note focuses solely on the determination of ownership liability under CERCLA 
§ 107(a). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4) (2012). 
 17. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting 
that ―CERCLA § 9607 is a strict liability statute‖). Imposing strict liability comports with 
Congressional intent; in its commentary on S. 1480, a precursor to CERCLA, the Committee on 
the Environment and Public Works indicated its desire to apply strict liability to environmental 
harms when it stated: 
Strict liability, the foundation of S. 1480, assures that those who benefit financially 
from a commercial activity internalize the health and environmental costs of that 
activity into the costs of doing business. Strict liability is an important instrument in 
allocating the risks imposed upon society by the manufacture, transport, use, and 
disposal of inherently hazardous substances . . . . To establish provisions of liability 
any less than strict, joint, and several liability would be to condone a system in which 
innocent victims bear the actual burden of releases, while those who conduct 
commerce in hazardous substances which cause such damage benefit with relative 
impunity. 
S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 13 (1980). 
 18. Liable parties will be held jointly and severally liable unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that (1) the harm is capable of reasonable apportionment, and (2) that the defendant 
should be liable for only a defined portion of the harm. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 559, 614 (2009). The burden of proving apportionment rests at all times 
on the defendant. Id. (citing United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. 
Ohio 1983)). 
 19. Liability will not attach if the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance was 
caused solely by:  
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terms of CERCLA liberally, so as to accomplish the statute‘s goal of 
effective environmental protection.
20
 
Federal courts have struggled to apply a consistent test to 
determine if a PRP is an ―owner‖ under CERCLA, particularly when 
a PRP possesses an interest in the contaminated property that is less 
than full title.
21
 The definition of an owner given by the statute is a 
tautology: ―[t]he term ‗owner or operator‘ means . . . any person 
owning or operating such facility.‖22 The unaccommodating nature of 
this definition has led courts to adopt a variety of tests to resolve the 
term‘s uncertain legal meaning.23  
 
(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party other than an 
employee or agent of the defendant, or [one in a contractual relationship with the 
defendant] . . . if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that 
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance . . . and (b) he took 
precautions against such foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(1)-(3) (2012). 
 20. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting 
―[b]ecause it is a remedial statute, CERCLA must be construed liberally to effectuate its two 
primary goals: (1) enabling the EPA to respond efficiently and expeditiously to toxic spills, and 
(2) holding those parties responsible for the releases liable for the costs of the cleanup‖). See 
also Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 881 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (holding ―[t]he remedy that Congress 
felt it needed in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-
waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup‖) (emphasis in 
original), overruled on other grounds by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 45 
(1996). 
 21. No cases directly on point have risen to the Supreme Court. Relevant but not essential 
to this Note‘s analysis is the decision in United States v. Bestfoods, which addressed operator 
liability under CERCLA § 107. After ruing the ―uselessness of CERCLA‘s definition of a 
facility‘s ‗operator‘ . . .‖ the Court applied the ―ordinary or natural‖ meaning of the word, 
concluding that ―under CERCLA, an operator is simply someone who . . . must manage, direct, 
or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with the 
leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental 
regulations.‖ 524 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1998). Court decisions on ownership liability often hinge on 
whether the term owner has a plain meaning. See infra note 59. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (2012). As the Ninth Circuit put it, ―[CERCLA] defines 
‗owner or operator‘ as ‗any person owning or operating‘ a toxic waste facility, which is a bit 
like defining ‗green‘ as ‗green.‘‖ Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin 
California Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 23. See United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 
(D.S.C. 1986), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 
160 (4th Cir. 1988) (utilizing the site control test); Commander Oil v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 
F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2000) (looking for sufficient indicia of ownership to hold the party liable as a 
de facto owner); City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(looking to the property rules of state common law for guidance); infra Part II. 
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This Note argues that a uniform approach is needed, and that a test 
that looks for discrete factors demonstrating sufficient indicia of 
ownership, giving rise to de facto ownership, is an appropriate 
method for determining an entity‘s liability as an owner. Part I of this 
Note discusses the legislative history of CERCLA. Part II presents 
the varying methods of analysis used by circuit courts to define a 
standard for CERCLA ownership, including (1) the site control 
analysis, (2) the de facto ownership test, and (3) deference to state 
common law. Part III then compares and evaluates the different court 
decisions that address CERCLA ownership standards, and posits that 
a test for de facto ownership is the proper metric for determining 
ownership liability. Finally, this Note concludes by arguing that a test 
for sufficient indicia of ownership is appropriate for assessing 
CERCLA liability because it affords a more consistent application of 
the statute across federal jurisdictions.  
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA 
 CERCLA‘s fragmentary history provides little illumination into 
the meaning of ―owner.‖24 However, CERCLA was preceded by four 
fully developed bills,
25
 and legislative discussions addressing the 
purpose of CERCLA‘s predecessor acts reveal Congress‘ intent to 
define an owner as one who need only possess sufficient indicia of 
ownership. The Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and 
Compensation Act
26
 defined an owner as ―any person holding title to, 
or in the absence of title, any indicia of ownership of a vessel or 
 
 24. Many courts have lamented the haste with which Congress passed the statute. See, 
e.g., United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (noting that ―[CERCLA] 
was hastily, and therefore, inadequately drafted . . . . Congress was not able to provide a 
clarifying committee report, thereby making it extremely difficult to pinpoint the intended 
scope of the legislation.‖); United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 
838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (describing 
CERCLA as a ―hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology 
and deleted provisions‖). 
 25. Commentators have noted that ―[m]any provisions of CERCLA were drawn from four 
previously considered bills, three of which (H.R. 85, S. 1480, and H.R. 7020) were fully 
developed by Congress through committee consideration, floor debate, and amendments. A 
fourth bill, the Administration Bill, S. 1311, was discussed in Senate hearings but never made it 
out of committee.‖  SWITZER, supra note 9, at 5. 
 26. H.R. 85, 96th Cong. (2d Sess. 1980). 
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facility . . . .‖27 Similarly, the Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation 
Fund, considered concurrently with the Comprehensive Oil Pollution 
Liability and Compensation Act, defined an owner as ―any person 
holding . . . any indicia of ownership . . . whether by lease, permit, 
contract, license, or other form of agreement . . . .‖28 Notably, these 
bills contained liability exceptions that depended on the sufficiency 
of each party‘s indicia of ownership, and explicitly excluded those 
parties who held sufficient indicia of ownership from liability when 
such was held only to ―protect their security interest in the vessel or 
facility . . . .‖29 This language was kept in the final CERCLA 
statute.
30
  
II. DIVERGING TESTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS 
A. Site Control 
In United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc.,
31
 
the Columbia Organic Chemical Company (COCC) entered into a 
verbal lease agreement with property title owners to store raw 
materials and chemicals on a small, four-acre plot in South 
Carolina.
32
 COCC operated the site under lease from 1974 to 1976, 
when it sublet the property to South Carolina Recycling and Disposal 
 
 27. H.R. 85, 96th Cong. § 101(x) (2d Sess. 1980) (emphasis added). 
 28. H.R. REP. NO. 96-172, pt. 2, at 45 (1980) (emphasis added). Although the particular 
phrasings of these definitions were not retained in the enacted bill, at a minimum, they 
demonstrate that Congress intended ownership liability to attach even to those with less than 
full title. 
 29. H.R. 85 § 101(x); Bill Summary Status (S. 1480), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d096:SN01480:@@@L&summ2=m& (demonstrating that at the time S. 
1480 was indefinitely postponed in favor of H.R. 7020, it excluded those ―who, without 
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, [held] indicia of ownership primarily to 
protect their security interests in the vessel or facility . . . .‖); Bill Summary Status (H.R. 7020), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d096:HR07020:@@L&summ2=m&. This 
bill was later passed as Public Law 96-510 and codified as CERCLA, and, at the time of this 
summary, contained language also excluding a person ―who without participating in the 
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership [sic] primarily to protect their 
security interests in the vessel or facility . . . .‖ 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (2012) (stating the term owner ―does not include a person, 
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership 
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility‖). 
 31. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986). 
 32. Id. at 990. 
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Inc. (SCRDI).
33
 SCRDI took over management of the site until 1978 
and assumed the verbal lease from the title owners that same year.
34 
 
During the course of storage operations, some 7,200 fifty-five-
gallon drums filled with various forms of hazardous material were 
―randomly and haphazardly stacked upon one another without regard 
to their source or the compatibility of the substances within.‖35 The 
improperly stored drums eventually deteriorated and began ―leaking 
and oozing‖ their contents onto the ground.36 
The EPA intervened and, after determining improper waste 
storage had released hazardous substances into the environment, took 
action to remediate the site.
37
 The EPA reached an agreement with 
COCC, SCRDI, and other PRPs under which the PRPs were to 
perform 75 percent of the cleanup, while money from the Superfund 
financed the remaining 25 percent.
38
 The EPA then brought civil 
actions against COCC and other PRPs for reimbursement of the 
Superfund costs.
39
 
To determine whether COCC was an owner under CERCLA and 
therefore liable, the district court looked to the extent of control and 
responsibility COCC maintained over the affected property during its 
leasehold.
40
 In a very brief explanation, the court found ―site control 
[was] an important consideration in determining who qualifie[d] as 
an ‗owner‘ under [CERCLA] Section 107(a).‖41 Because COCC 
maintained control over and responsibility for the property as a 
lessee, the court determined that COCC essentially ―stood in the 
 
 33. Id. COCC‘s decision to store waste on site was made by three individuals: James 
McClure, Max Gergl, and Henry Tischler. Id. These individuals later incorporated SCRDI and 
continued hazardous waste storage under the new corporation. Id. 
 34. Id. Between 1976 and 1978, SCRDI operated the land on a month-to-month sublease 
from COCC. Id. at 1000. 
 35. Id. at 990. 
 36. Id. Exposure of substances contained in the drums to the outside environment resulted 
in ―a number of fires and explosions and generated noxious and toxic fumes.‖ Id. 
 37. Id. at 990–91. 
 38. Id. at 991. 
 39. Id. at 989–91. In total, thirteen entities identified as PRPs agreed to perform 75 
percent of the removal work at the site. Id. Of those, four waste generators (AquAir 
Corporation, Allied Corporation, Monsanto Company, and EM Industries, Inc.), the property 
owners (Harvey Hutchinson and Oscar Seidenberg), the current operator (SCRDI), and COCC 
were collectively sued for reimbursement. Id. at 999. 
 40. Id. at 1003.  
 41. Id.  
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shoes of the property owners‖ and should be held liable as an 
owner.
42
 The court reasoned that assigning ownership liability against 
parties who controlled the site would achieve Congress‘ goal of 
holding those responsible for hazardous conditions liable for costs of 
remediation.
43
 The court also remarked that such a decision 
comported with common principles of landlord-tenant law.
44
 
Moreover, the court found it persuasive that COCC‘s sublease 
agreement with SCRDI imbued COCC with additional 
responsibilities to monitor the operations of its sublessor, therefore 
indicating an additional level of control.
45
  
B. De Facto Ownership 
In Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp.,
46
 the Second 
Circuit adopted a different test. In 1963, Commander Oil Corp. 
acquired two lots of land around Nassau County, New York.
47
 At the 
time of the purchase, Lot 7A included office and warehouse space, 
while Lot 7B contained above-ground storage tanks that Commander 
Oil used as a fuel depot.
48
 In 1964, Commander Oil leased Lot 7A to 
Barlo Equipment Corp., and in 1969, leased Lot 7B to Pasley 
Solvents & Chemicals, Inc.
49
 In 1972, Commander Oil consolidated 
the lots into a single lease to Barlo, which in turn sublet Lot 7B to 
Pasley.
50
 Nine years later, the Nassau County Department of Health 
discovered contamination on lot 7B, leading to EPA intervention and 
a suit against Commander Oil and other defendants for response costs 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. The court made a point that ―a lessor or sublessor who allows property under his 
control to be used by another in a manner which endangers third parties or which creates a 
nuisance, is, along with the lessee or sublessee, liable for the harm.‖ Id. (emphasis added) 
(citing California ex rel. Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, rev’d in part 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Sec‘y of the 
Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (recognizing that the lessor may be liable for 
activities carried on by the lessee), and Daigle v. Cont‘l Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. La. 
1967) (holding oil company landowner and carbon company lessee liable in solido)). 
 46. 215 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 47. Id. at 324. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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incurred by the EPA in remediating the site.
51
 In a consent agreement 
between Commander Oil and the EPA, Commander Oil agreed to 
reimburse ―past and future response costs incurred in connection with 
the [s]ite,‖ while maintaining the right to sue other PRPs for 
contribution.
52
  
In 1990, Commander Oil brought an action against Barlo and 
Pasley in federal district court, seeking contribution for costs.
53
 The 
district court rejected Barlo‘s argument that an ―owner under 
CERCLA § 107(a) meant a ‗record owner,‘‖ and instead held that ―a 
lessee who has control over and responsibility for the use of the 
property is the owner of the property for CERCLA purposes.‖54 Thus, 
Barlo was liable as an owner by virtue of its ―authority and control‖ 
over lot 7B.
55
 Barlo appealed the decision to the Second Circuit, 
which disagreed with the district court and reversed.
56
 
The Second Circuit adopted a liberal interpretation of CERCLA, 
broadly construing the statute‘s terms to ―hold[] those parties 
responsible for the releases liable for the costs of the cleanup.‖57 
However, wary of overextending the statute‘s strict liability to 
unfairly reach non-responsible parties, the circuit court refused to 
―automatically assign liability to every party with any connection to a 
contaminated facility.‖58  
Like the court in South Carolina Recycling, the Second Circuit 
struggled to tease-out a tenable definition of an ―owner‖ under the 
statute.
59
 In its arguments, Barlo advocated that CERCLA liability be 
 
 51. Id. at 325. 
 52. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 55. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 56. Id. at 324. 
 57. The circuit court‘s liberal interpretation of the statute was taken to effectuate 
Congress‘ goals of ―(1) enabling the EPA to respond efficiently and expeditiously to toxic 
spills, and (2) holding those parties responsible for the releases liable for the costs of the 
cleanup.‖ Id. at 327 (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 
1992)). The term ―release‖ is broadly construed, and generally means ―any spilling, leaking, 
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or 
disposing into the environment . . . .‖ 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2012). 
 58. Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 327. 
 59. Id. The Second Circuit looked to the Supreme Court‘s analysis in United States v. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), for guidance. The Bestfoods Court managed to resolve the 
ambiguity of defining the term ―operator‖ by looking to its ―ordinary or natural meaning.‖ The 
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read narrowly to encompass only those with fee title, while 
Commander Oil pressed for a more expansive interpretation that 
rested primarily on the right to control the property.
60
 The circuit 
court was conflicted, finding both interpretations plausible facial 
constructions of the term, and that no dictionary could provide a 
satisfactory plain meaning.
61
  
Having failed to uncover the ordinary meaning of a CERCLA 
owner, the Second Circuit turned to other jurisdictions for assistance. 
The court found this exercise equally unhelpful, noting that ―courts 
and commentators have supplied no consistent guidance as to which 
rights in the proverbial property bundle define ownership,‖ and those 
that had attempted to define owner ―held that site control is a 
sufficient indicator of ownership to impose liability on lessees or 
sublessors.‖62 The court disagreed with this reasoning and rejected 
the site control test, observing that owner liability and operator 
liability denote two separate concepts; holding an owner liable 
because she exercised control over a facility would subsume operator 
liability into ownership liability.
63
 To avoid redundancy in statutory 
interpretation
64
 by intermingling ownership and operator liability, the 
 
Second Circuit in Commander Oil followed the same analysis, but was ultimately unable to find 
a natural meaning for the term ―owner‖ that would resolve the issue of Barlo‘s ownership 
status.  Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 327. 
 60. Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 327. 
 61. Id. The court looked to Webster’s Dictionary, which defined an owner as ―one that has 
the legal or rightful title whether the possessor or not.‖ Id. (quoting WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1612 (1981)). This 
definition supported Commander Oil‘s expansive interpretation. The court also cited to Black’s 
Law Dictionary, which defined an owner as ―[o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and 
convey something,‖ or ―[o]ne who has the primary or residual title to property.‖ Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (7th ed. 1999)). This interpretation 
supported Barlo‘s argument that an owner must have fee title. Ultimately, the Second Circuit 
concluded that ―unlike ‗operator,‘ the term ‗owner‘ has no natural meaning that could resolve 
the dispute.‖ Id. 
 62. Id. at 328 (citing United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. 
Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1986)). 
 63. Id. (citing Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 64 (finding ―[i]f the act rested liability entirely on 
ownership of a polluting facility, this opinion might end here; but CERCLA liability may turn 
on operation as well as ownership . . .‖)); Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(observing that ―owner liability and operator liability denote two separate concepts, [and] courts 
stress the disjunctive character of CERCLA liability‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (noting the ―cardinal principle of 
statutory construction‖ that ―a statute ought . . . to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, 
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Second Circuit concluded that ―site control alone is an improper basis 
for the imposition of owner liability.‖65 
Instead, the Second Circuit produced a five-factor, non-exclusive 
test for ownership when the possessor lacks full title.
66
 Although the 
court was reluctant to impose ―new and unexpected liability‖ upon 
leaseholders,
67
 the Second Circuit held that a non-fee simple lessee 
could be liable under the ownership provision of CERCLA when that 
lessee possessed sufficient ―indicia of ownership‖ to be a de facto 
owner.
68
 The court then articulated five non-exclusive factors 
denoting ownership, including:  
(1) whether the lease is for an extensive term and admits of no 
rights in the owner/lessor to determine how the property is 
used; (2) whether the lease cannot be terminated by the owner 
before it expires by its terms; (3) whether the lessee has the 
right to sublet all or some of the property without notifying the 
owner; (4) whether the lessee is responsible for payment of all 
taxes, assessments, insurance, and operation and maintenance 
costs; and (5) whether the lessee is responsible for making all 
structural and other repairs.
69
  
The factors selected by the court reinforced the idea that the 
determinative element was the right of the lessee to manipulate the 
general privileges of property ownership, and not the extent to which 
the lessee might control operations on the site.
70
 
Although the Second Circuit acknowledged that lessees might be 
liable as owners under CERCLA, it declined to extend such liability 
 
no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant‖ (quoting Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
 65. Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 329. 
 66. Id. at 330–31. 
 67. Id. at 330. The court believed it would be unfair to impose the potentially ruinous 
costs of CERCLA‘s strict, joint, and several liability on an entity that was unaware it had an 
obligation to check for and contain environmental contamination on the leased property. Id. 
(recognizing that lessees are only concerned with environmental hazards to the extent that ―the 
property is adequate for the tenant‘s purposes and that there are no on-site environmental 
conditions or features which would impair the tenant‘s ability to operate‖). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 330–31. 
 70. Id. at 331. 
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to Barlo.
71
 Despite Barlo‘s existing obligations to the property, the 
company lacked sufficient attributes of ownership over lot 7B to be a 
de facto owner.
72
 The Second Circuit found it persuasive that Barlo‘s 
use of the leased property was limited to Lot A and not Lot B, that 
Barlo needed Commander Oil‘s permission before subletting or 
altering the property (which alterations would become Commander 
Oil‘s property anyway), that Barlo was required to keep the property 
clean to Commander Oil‘s satisfaction, and that Barlo was prohibited 
from taking any action that would ―in any way increase the rate of 
fire insurance on the property.‖73 The court also found it relevant that 
the lease between Barlo and Commander Oil was short,
74
 and that 
Commander Oil retained many of the rights and obligations of 
ownership over the property.
75
 
 
 71. Id. at 330–32. 
 72. The Second Circuit found Barlo‘s obligation to secure insurance for the lot, its 
liability to Commander Oil for all assessments on the property and increases in taxes, and its 
assumed responsibility for all nonstructural repairs to be indicative of ownership; but ultimately 
held that even with these attributes, ―Barlo lacked most of the bundle of rights that comes with 
ownership of property,‖ and should not therefore be liable as an owner. Id. at 332. 
 73. Id. at 330–31 (internal quotations omitted). Specifically, Barlo was 
(1) limited to using lot 7A, and only ―for that business presently conducted by tenant 
on a portion of the same premises leased hereunder‖; (2) required to obtain written 
consent from Commander Oil before making ―any additions, alterations or 
improvements‖ on the land, which alterations would become Commander Oil‘s 
property in any event; (3) required to obtain written approval from Commander Oil to 
sublet the property, and prohibited from subletting to any entity that had ―any 
connection with the fuel, fuel oil or oil business‖; (4) required to obtain written 
permission from Commander Oil to display any ―sign, advertisement, notice or other 
lettering‖ on the building; (5) required to keep the property ―clean and in order to the 
satisfaction of‖ Commander Oil, and responsible for any damage Barlo itself caused to 
the premises or to the ―systems or equipment or any installation therein‖; and 
(6) prohibited from doing anything that would ―in any way increase the rate of fire 
insurance‖ on the property, and from bringing or keeping upon the premises ―any 
inflammable, combustible or explosive fluid, chemical or substance.‖ 
Id. 
 74. Id. at 330 (noting that Barlo‘s short-term, five-year lease was less indicative of de 
facto ownership than a longer, ninety-nine-year lease). 
 75. Within the provisions of the lease, Commander Oil; 
(1) reserved for its own use a right to enter the lot for various purposes; (2) reserved 
for its own use three oil storage tanks on lot 7B; (3) reserved an ―option‖ to use, on 
written notice to Barlo, ―certain office space‖ within lot 7A; (4) reserved the right to 
maintain ―its aerial or a comparable aerial‖ on the roof of the building; and (6) [sic] 
assumed responsibility to make structural repairs.  
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C. Looking to State Common Law 
In the recent case City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works,
76
 
the Ninth Circuit premised its assessment of CERCLA ownership 
liability on analogous determinations of ownership liability in the 
California common law. In 1965, the City of Los Angeles issued a 
revocable permit (―Revocable Permit 936‖) to the Los Angeles 
Harbor Marine Corporation to operate a boatworks facility at Berth 
44 ―for the repair, maintenance, and rebuilding of ships and boats‖ in 
the Port of Los Angeles.
77
 Four years later, Pacific American 
purchased all assets of the Los Angeles Harbor Marine Corporation 
in Berth 44—including Revocable Permit 936—and immediately 
transferred all assets except the permit to its newly formed and 
wholly owned subsidiary, the San Pedro Boat Works (―San Pedro‖).78 
Pacific American ―rid itself of its last direct connection with Berth 
44‖ in 1970, when it exchanged Revocable Permit 936 for Revocable 
Permit 1076, which it then assigned to San Pedro some ten months 
later.
79
 Aside from possessing the boatworks operating permit for ten 
months, at no time did Pacific American own any of the assets at the 
boatworks; at all relevant times, San Pedro was the sole owner and 
operator of the facility.
80
 In 1993, BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Company 
of Los Angeles (―BCI‖) purchased Pacific American and assumed all 
of its liabilities.
81
 
Two years after BCI‘s acquisition, the City of Los Angeles 
assessed the soil and water around Berth 44 for contamination.
82
 The 
City found a variety of toxic and hazardous contaminants and, by 
2003, had begun cleanup activities.
83
 The City sued San Pedro, 
 
Id. at 331.  
 76. 635 F.3d 440 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 77. Id. at 444. The City issued the permit through its Board of Harbor Commissioners, 
which was responsible for ―issuing franchises, permits, and leases for use of the land at the Los 
Angeles Harbor [including the Port of Los Angeles].‖ Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 445. The Ninth Circuit‘s opinion does not mention any change in conditions 
between Permit 936 and Permit 1076, and the court‘s analysis does not seem to be affected by 
the exchange.  
 80. Id. at 444–45.  
 81. Id. at 445.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. Some contaminants identified by the City included: ―volatile organic compounds, 
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Pacific American, and BCI for cleanup costs in federal court, arguing 
Pacific American—and consequently BCI—was liable as an owner 
because Pacific American held a revocable permit to operate the 
boatworks at Berth 44 for ten months between 1969 and 1970.
84
 The 
district court was not persuaded, finding the Revocable Permits 
―insufficient to establish owner liability of Pacific American, and 
thus of BCI Coca–Cola as successor-in-interest, under CERCLA.‖85  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, relying on its prior 
decision in Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Godwin Liv. Trust.
86
 In 
Long Beach, the circuit court held the tautological nature of 
CERCLA‘s definitions ―provide[d] a clue to the legislature‘s purpose  
. . . [and] strongly implie[d] that the statutory terms ha[d] their 
ordinary meanings rather than unusual or technical meanings.‖87 
Unlike in Commander Oil—where the Second Circuit failed to divine 
such ―plain meaning‖88—the Ninth Circuit in City of Los Angeles 
found the ordinary meaning of a CERCLA owner ―incorporate[d] the 
common law definition of [the term].‖89 The reasoning in Long 
Beach—which led to the application of ―common law analogies‖ to 
CERCLA‘s statutory terms—turned in part on amendments to H.R. 
7020, one of CERCLA‘s precursors, which allowed a court to refuse 
to apportion damages in circumstances where the prevailing state 
common law prohibited such apportionment.
90
 
Without much discussion, the court in City of Los Angeles rejected 
the tests for ownership liability from South Carolina Recycling and 
 
petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, copper, 
lead, mercury, and chromium.‖ Id. 
 84. Id. at 445–46. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 32 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 87. Id. at 1368 (quoting Edward Hines Lumber v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 
156 (7th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 88. See supra note 61. 
 89. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1368 (citing Edward Hines Lumber, 861 F.2d at 157). 
 90. The court in Long Beach relied heavily on the reasoning from Edward Hines Lumber, 
which in turn cited to the district court decision in Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 
1484 (D. Colo. 1985), for the proposition that since an operator was undefined in the federal 
statute, a court should ―turn to common law analogies, as the sponsors of the legislation 
anticipated.‖ Edward Hines Lumber, 861 F.2d at 157 (citing ASARCO, 608 F. Supp at 1488–89 
(quoting 126 Cong. Rec. 26, 785 (1980))). 
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Commander Oil.
91
 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit criticized the site 
control analysis and five-factor test for de facto ownership as being 
―nebulous and flexible analytic framework[s]‖ that ―d[id] not clearly 
call out what an investor in land can expect and which factors [were] 
themselves susceptible to endless manipulation in litigation.‖92 
Instead, the court relied on Long Beach to hold that the California 
common law definition of an owner did not extend to the holder of a 
revocable permit for restricted uses of real property.
93
  
Under this interpretation, Pacific American could not be liable as 
an owner under CERCLA. The California common law recognized 
that the holder of a revocable permit retained an interest in land 
―comparable to the interest of a licensee or easement holder.‖94 
California courts had consistently distinguished between these less 
than full title interests and ownership.
95
 While this distinction was 
usually observed in real property tax disputes against leaseholders,
96
 
the Ninth Circuit found it applicable in City of Los Angeles, noting 
―[a] leasehold is not an ownership interest, unlike the possession of 
land in fee simple.‖97 Since a lease ―usually confers greater property 
interests than does a revocable permit,‖ Pacific American‘s ten-
month interest in the boatworks was not sufficient to impose liability 
for costs of environmental cleanup.
98
 
 
 91. City of Los Angeles, 635 F.3d 440, 449 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Such interests in land were merely ―an interest in real property which exist[ed] as a 
result of possession, exclusive use, or a right to possession or exclusive use of land 
unaccompanied by the ownership of a fee simple or life estate in the property, which ownership 
interest is retained by the fee title owner of the property . . . and may exist as the result of a 
grant, among others, of a leasehold estate, a profit a prendre, or any other legal or equitable 
interest of less than freehold.‖ Id. at 449–50 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bd. of Supervisors 
v. Archer, 96 Cal. Rptr. 379, 386 (1971)). 
 96. Id. at 450 n.7. 
 97. Id. at 450 (quoting Auerbach v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 1 for County of Los 
Angeles., 39 Cal. 4th 153 (2006)). The California Court‘s decision in Auerbach was based, in 
part, on the recognition that the communal vernacular distinguished between ―owners‖ and 
―leaseholders.‖ As the Auerbach court stated, ―[i]t is for that reason that common parlance 
refers to the ‗owner‘ of a freehold estate, encumbered or unencumbered, but to the ‗holder‘ of a 
lease; [the reason being] the freeholder is seised of land, whereas the leaseholder is not.‖ 
Auerbach, 39 Cal. 4th at 163 (quoting Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 
1 Cal. 4th 155, 163 (1991)). 
 98. City of Los Angeles, 635 F.3d at 450. Similarly, since Pacific American was not liable 
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The Ninth Circuit reasoned that such a holding was consistent 
with Congress‘ intent for the statute. Because Congress failed to 
specify whether a ―‗de facto owner,‘ or ‗possessor,‘ or ‗person with 
some incidents or attributes of ownership,‘‖ was subject to owner 
liability—as it had in other legislation99—the Ninth Circuit read the 
unmodified use of owner to imply an ―absolute owner.‖100 According 
to the court, this reading would still accomplish CERCLA‘s objective 
to hold responsible parties liable for environmental contamination, 
since Ninth Circuit precedent already recognized an expansive 
reading of ‗operator‘ liability.101 Thus, a more restrictive 
interpretation of CERCLA ownership liability would still ensure that 
liability attached to ―passive fee title owner[s] of real property [as 
well as] the active (or negligent) operator of the facility who ha[d] 
only a possessory interest in the owner‘s real property.‖102 Therefore, 
a broad reading of the statutory term was unnecessary, because those 
responsible parties with less than full title would likely be liable as 
operators. 
The Ninth Circuit was careful, however, not to overextend its 
reasoning and exempt all interests less than full title from CERCLA 
owner liability. Rather, the circuit court suggested, without deciding, 
that Congress intended to limit owners to those ―possessing all the 
proverbial ‗sticks in the bundle of rights,‘ including fee title to the 
real property.‖103 Thus, the court tenuously managed to distinguish its 
decision from the holding in Commander Oil, maintaining that  
 
as an owner of the boatworks, BCI, as successor-in-interest, was also absolved from liability. 
Id. at 452.  
 99. The Ninth Circuit pointed to 26 U.S.C. § 2042(2), which stated that ―a life insurance 
policy can be included in the decedent‘s gross estate for estate tax purposes as if owned by the 
decedent, if the decedent possessed ‗incidents of ownership‘ in the insurance policy.‖ Id. at 451. 
 100. Id. at 450 (citing Dirs. of Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Abila, 106 Cal. 355, 362 (1895)). The 
Ninth Circuit expressed the opinion that if Congress had intended to impose strict liability on 
holders of mere possessory interests in real property, it would have spoken clearly on the issue, 
rather than framing the statute in an ambiguous manner. Id. 
 101. See id. at 451 n.9 (recognizing that ―[u]nder Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. 
Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992), CERCLA operator liability has been 
expansively interpreted by this court to extend to any party with the authority to control the 
cause of the contamination at the time the hazardous substances were released into the 
environment‖) (internal quotations omitted). 
 102. Id. at 444. 
 103. Id. at 452 n.10. 
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―Pacific American‘s revocable permits vested fewer rights in the real 
property than did the lease in Commander Oil,‖ and thus its result 
was ―not at odds with that of the Second Circuit.‖104 
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
Of the various tests used to assess CERCLA ownership liability 
when a PRP has less than full title, the Second Circuit‘s de facto 
ownership test is the most appropriate because it is the most effective 
at promoting Congress‘ goal for the statute.  
A. Site Control is an Inappropriate Test For CERCLA Ownership 
Liability 
The site control test is an inappropriate measure of ownership 
liability because the liability it assigns is overbroad. Possessing 
control over a facility is more indicative of CERCLA operator status 
than owner status.
105
 Courts have distinguished these two subsets of 
liability,
106
 and a test that recombines them will introduce redundancy 
into the federal statute, will run contrary to judicial prudence, and 
will frustrate efficient future execution of the law. Other jurisdictions 
have recognized the problems associated with this approach and have 
 
 104. Id. The factors the Ninth Circuit found persuasive were: the fact that Pacific 
American‘s revocable permit could be terminated by the City at any time, that Pacific American 
could not convey the permit to another entity without the City‘s permission, that Pacific 
American could not change the boatworks to a different commercial operation without the 
City‘s permission, and that Pacific American could not hold up the land and structures at Berth 
44 as security for a loan. Id. Cf. supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text (describing the 
limits of Barlo‘s authority under its lease with Commander Oil). 
 105. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Bestfoods, defined an operator under 
CERCLA as one who ―must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to 
pollution, that is, operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or 
decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.‖ 524 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1998). See 
also supra note 21. Under the site control test used by the district court in United States v. South 
Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., an owner ―maintained control over and responsibility for 
the use of the property . . . .‖ 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1986). As the Second Circuit in 
Commander Oil noted, ―[e]ven a cursory examination of the basis for operator liability reveals 
that it would be almost entirely subsumed by owner liability that relied on site control analysis.‖ 
Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 328. 
 106. Supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol43/iss1/17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Ownership Liability under CERCLA 351 
 
 
soundly rejected a determination of ownership premised upon site 
control.
107
  
B. Looking to Analogous State Common Law is Inappropriate For 
Finding CERCLA Ownership Liability 
Using concepts of ownership derived from state common law is 
unsuitable as a standard for CERCLA liability. Such an approach will 
create inconsistent determinations of liability as a result of the 
inherent peculiarities unique to each state‘s common law. 
Environmental contamination and the remediation and removal of 
hazardous wastes are inter-state issues with inter-state implications, 
and it is therefore necessary that liability under CERCLA be assessed 
uniformly, no matter the jurisdiction.
108
 Relying on state common law 
standards of ownership will obstruct efforts to hold responsible 
parties accountable, because such parties can evade liability by taking 
advantage of discrepancies in state common law and seeking safe 
havens in state jurisdictions with more favorable standards of 
ownership.
109
 Consequently, the purposes of CERCLA can be better 
achieved through a uniform national response, rather than 
differentiated local treatment.
110
 Thus, the Ninth Circuit‘s reliance on 
the California tax code to guide its implementation of a federal 
environmental statute was inappropriate.
111
  
CERCLA is a statute subject to uniquely federal interests that 
compel national uniformity. The monies expended from the 
Superfund are replenished not only from contributions of responsible 
parties but from the national treasury, as well, through federal 
 
 107. See Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 329; San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d at 449. See 
also Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 67–68 (rejecting the ―actual control‖ test). 
 108. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Often 
hazardous sites will be comprised of waste produced by companies in several states within one 
regional area. The pollution produced can affect groundwater, surface water, and air, and can as 
a result raise concerns about health and safety across state lines. Id.  
 109. See id. at 809 (stating ―[a] liability standard which varies in the different forum states 
would undermine the policies of [CERCLA] by encouraging illegal dumping in states with lax 
liability laws‖). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See City of Los Angeles, 634 F.3d at 450 n.7 (citing CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 107(a) 
(West 2011)). 
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taxation and federal appropriations.
112
 Thus, the degree to which the 
federal government can secure the financial future of the Hazardous 
Substance Superfund created by CERCLA to finance remediation 
efforts ―is directly related to the scope of liability under CERCLA, 
and is in no way dependent upon the laws of any state.‖113  
Moreover, according to the United States Supreme Court, when 
the EPA authorizes disbursement from the Superfund, the federal 
government is exercising a constitutionally granted authority.
114
  The 
Court made clear that ―[w]hen the United States derives its authority 
for reimbursement from a specific Act of Congress passed in the 
exercise of a constitutional function or power, its rights should also 
derive from federal common law.‖115 The ability to create and 
enforce federal specialized common law is permitted when 
―necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,‖116 and in this context 
the interests to be protected are uniquely federal. Forcing PRP 
reimbursement of remediation costs into the constraints of state-
defined ownership standards could severely limit the amount of 
recovery provided, draining the Superfund, and ultimately restricting 
the EPA‘s ability to respond to existing contaminated sites or address 
future episodes of contamination and hazardous releases.  
Central to the development of CERCLA was the understanding 
that Congress‘ goals for the statute could not be achieved through 
action exclusively at the state level.
117
 A uniform federal response 
was needed.
118
 Such uniform programs require uniform rules of 
 
 112. Supra note 14. 
 113. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808. 
 114. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (holding that ―[w]hen 
the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional function 
or power . . . . The authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes 
of the United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of . . . any other state.‖). 
 115. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809. 
 116. Id. (quoting Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 415 U.S. 630, 640 
(1981)). 
 117. Id. at 808. See also id. at 809. 
 118. For example, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce acutely 
observed that:  
Existing state tort laws present a convoluted maze of requirements under which a 
victim is confronted with a complex of often unreasonable requirements with regard to 
theories of causation, limited resources, statutes of limitations and other roadblocks 
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decision, and the national interest in consistent application of 
CERCLA ownership standards favors a test that avoids reliance on 
state common law.
119
  
C. The De Facto Test is the Most Appropriate Test for CERCLA 
Ownership Liability 
The Second Circuit‘s test in Commander Oil is the most 
appropriate methodology for approaching ownership liability under 
CERCLA because it provides a framework for uniform application of 
the statute‘s liability standard. When a clear determination of 
ownership is absent—such as when a PRP holds less than full title—
use of a predetermined set of criteria to evaluate a PRP‘s indicia of 
ownership can best resolve uncertainties as to ownership status, 
particularly should a suit arise involving cross-jurisdictional 
contamination.  
Such a test is also supported by CERCLA‘s legislative history. As 
all three of the statute‘s predecessor bills wound their convoluted way 
through Congress, they each utilized ―indicia of ownership‖ as a 
determinative element in assessing ownership liability.
120
 
Importantly, in the final statute, Congress purposefully excluded 
lenders from liability as owners, so long as such lenders assumed 
attributes of ownership solely as a security interest.
121
 That Congress 
felt the need to exempt these lenders supports the conclusion that 
Congress intended CERCLA liability to attach upon a finding of 
sufficient indicia of ownership, and did not intend for courts to find 
 
that make it extremely difficult for a victim to be compensated for damages. A clear, 
uniform federal law defining a victim‘s cause of action in these areas is sorely needed . 
 . . . 
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, 63–64 (1980). 
 119. As the Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. stated, ―federal programs that ‗by 
their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation‘ necessitate formulation 
of controlling federal rules . . . . Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform 
body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision.‖ 440 U.S. 715, 728 
(1979).  
 120. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 121. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E) (2012) (explicitly including lenders in the exception to 
ownership for those who only have indicia of ownership as a security interest). 
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liability based on the particulars of state common law or upon a 
PRP‘s active role in site management.122  
CONCLUSION 
Utilizing a discrete, factor-based test to evaluate indicia of 
ownership is the appropriate method for assessing ownership liability 
under CERCLA. Using the extent of site control as a basis for 
ownership liability is inappropriate because it subsumes CERCLA‘s 
related but distinct ‗operator‘ liability. Similarly, relying on state 
common law standards for ownership is improper because CERCLA 
is a federal statute with national implications that should be applied 
uniformly. Following state common law will frustrate CERCLA‘s 
purpose by allowing otherwise responsible PRPs to escape liability 
under more favorable state standards of ownership, thwarting the 
EPA‘s attempts to recover the costs of remediation from the 
responsible owner. Instead, implementing a factor-based test, like 
that utilized by the Second Circuit in Commander Oil, is the best 
judicial approach. Such a test is a logical extension of the existing 
statutory framework: it acknowledges Congress‘ intent to use indicia 
of ownership as a measurement of liability, and it allows the EPA and 
the federal courts to assess PRP ownership liability under the federal 
statute in a consistent and uniform manner across jurisdictions at the 
national level. 
 
 122. The Second Circuit‘s decision is consistent with this analysis. See Commander Oil, 
215 F.3d at 329. 
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